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COMMENT
THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION IN ANTITRUST:
FROM PARKER V. BROWN TO CANTOR V.
DETROIT EDISON CO.
In Parker v. Brown,I the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did
not prohibit restraints on commerce imposed by a state acting as sovereign.
It thus apparently resolved the potential conflict between the expanding
scope of the Act under the commerce clause and state regulation of intrastate
commerce. In establishing this state action exemption, however, the Court
indicated that certain acts by the state would not be immune from the federal
antitrust laws. As the lower courts attempted to apply the Parker holding,
they encountered difficulty in determining whether the challenged activity
constituted state action and, if so, whether it fell within one or two
exceptions to state action immunity noted by the Parker Court.
In applying the state action exemption, the courts typically looked for
factors present in Parker, primarily, state intent to restrict competition and
the degree of state involvement in the activity in terms of implementation,
supervision or control. Although the emphasis given particular factors and
the results reached were inconsistent, the courts generally limited the poten-
tial reach of Parker by allowing the exemption only when the chal-
lenged activity reflected a conscious state policy. The Supreme Court
decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar2 confirmed this trend, since the
standard it enunciated-that the activity must be required by the state-
appeared even stricter than those previously imposed in the lower courts.
The significance of the Goldfarb test was unclear, however, since the Court
mentioned additional factors which may have formed the basis for its
decision.3
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. I presented the Court with a situation to
which the Parker doctrine has been frequently applied and which satisfied
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69
Nw. U.L. REV. 71 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Slater].
1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
3. See notes 44-49, 61 infra and accompanying text.
4. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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the Goldfarb standard in at least a literal sense. 5 The case thus offered the
Court an excellent opportunity to clarify the Goldfarb decision and to
establish the appropriate standards to be used in applying the Parker exemp-
tion. Although the Court's conclusion that the challenged activity was not
protected from the operation of the Sherman Act was not surprising in light
of the minimal degree of state involvement, the reasoning of the plurality,
particularly in its emphasis on the identity of the parties involved in the suit
rather than the challenged anticompetitive activity, perpetuated the ambigui-
ty of Goldfarb and further complicated the already difficult task of applying
Parker. In order to gauge the impact of Cantor, this Comment will first
examine the formulation of the Parker exemption and its application by the
courts prior to Cantor.6 It will then analyze the Cantor decision, emphasiz-
ing its further complication of the state action inquiry.
I. THE PARKER V. BROWN DECISION
When Congress passed the Sherman Act7 in 1890 it contemplated a
complementary relationship between the federal law and pre-existing state
statutes aimed at preventing or controlling monopolies or combinations in
restraint of trade. 8 Though Congress intended to exercise all the power it
possessed, 9 the narrow scope of its power under the commerce clause as
then interpreted' ° did not permit the invasion of a state's authority to
regulate commerce within its borders. As the Supreme Court began to
recognize an expanded commerce clause power, allowing Congress to
regulate intrastate activities if they had a significant impact on interstate
commerce," the scope of the Sherman Act was also expanded. 12 Conse-
5. Cantor involved a public utility rate schedule which the utility was required to follow
until a new one was adopted.
6. The Court has recently applied the Parker doctrine to a state supreme court's prohibi-
tion of attorney advertising. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977). The Court
distinguished Cantor on several grounds, but did not examine that decision in any detail. See
note 162 infra.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
8. No attempt is made to invade the legislative authority of the several States or
even to occupy doubtful grounds. No system of laws can be devised by Congress
alone which would effectively protect the people of the United States against the
evils and oppression of the trusts and monopolies. Congress has no authority to deal,
generally, with the subject within the States, and the States have no authority to
legislate in respect of commerce between the several States or with foreign nations.
It follows, therefore, that the legislative authority of Congress and that of the
several States must be exerted to secure the suppression of restraints upon trade and
monopolies. Whatever legislation Congress may enact on this subject, within the
limits of its authority, will prove of little value unless the States shall supplement it by
such auxiliary and proper legislation as may be within their legislative authority.
H.R. REP. NO. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890).
9. 20 CONG. REC. 1167 (1889).
10. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 632 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting);
Slater 84. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888).
11. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,.301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937), the Court stated:
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quently, state regulation of commerce which would have been considered
domestic in 1890 might today be subject to federal preemption under the
commerce clause and fall within the scope of the Sherman Act.
The Court first faced this potential conflict in Olsen v. Smith, 3 reject-
ing the contention that a Texas law, which in effect granted state commis-
sioned pilots a monopoly of the pilotage business in the port of Galveston,
was repugnant to the federal antitrust laws.14 The implications of Olsen
were developed into an express exemption in Parker. Emphasizing the
legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Parker Court held that a restraint
on commerce imposed by a state acting as sovereign was not prohibited by
the Sherman Act.15
Parker involved a challenge to a California program regulating the
marketing of raisins pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act, 16
the purpose of which, was "to restrict competition among the growers and
maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers." 17 The
Act authorized the creation of an Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commis-
sion18 which had power to grant petitions by producers for the establishment
of a prorate marketing zone, to appoint a committee to formulate a market-
ing program for that commodity, to modify any suggested program and to
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.
12. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
13. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
14. Id. at 344-45. The language of the Court in Olsen strongly implied that though such a
monopoly by private persons might violate the antitrust laws, when it resulted from state
regulation it did not:
The contention that because the commissioned pilots have a monopoly of the busi-
ness, and by combination among themselves exclude all others from rendering
pilotage services, is also but a denial of the authority of the State to regulate, since if
the State has the power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and commission those
who are to perform pilotage services, it must follow that no monopoly or combination
in a legal sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the State are
alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law.
Id.
15. 317 U.S. at 352.
16. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stats. 1969, as amended by chs. 603, 1150 &
1186, 1941 Cal. Stats. 2050, 2858 & 2943; chs. 363, 548 & 894, 1939 Cal. Stats. 1702, 1947 &
2485; ch. 6, 1938 Cal. Stats. Extra Sess. 39; & chs. 471 & 473, 1935 Cal. Stats. 1526 & 2087. The'
current provisions of the Act are embodied in the Agricultural Producers Marketing Law, CAL.
AGRIC. CODE §§ 59501-60015 (West 1968).
17. 317 U.S. at 346.
18. The Commission was composed of state officials with the Director of Agriculture
serving ex officio. The Act, however, provided for participation by the producers. Before
granting a petition or approving a plan the Commission was required to hold public hearings. An
approved plan could not become effective without the consent of 65% of the producers in a
zone who owned 51% of the acreage devoted to production of the crop being regulated.
Thereafter, the program was administered by the Director of Agriculture, and penalties for
noncompliance were prescribed. Id. at 346-47.
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give final approval after determining that a program would promote the
objectives of the Act without permitting unreasonable profits.' 9
Under one marketing program, producers had to deliver all raisins they
wished to market to stations where the raisins were graded. The producer
was then permitted to sell less than one-third of his standard raisins through
ordinary commercial channels after obtaining a certificate designed to con-
trol "the time and volume of movement" of such "free-tonnage" raisins. 20
One-half of the standard raisins were placed in a stabilization pool to be
disposed of "in such manner so as to obtain stability in the market and to
dispose of such raisins," 21 though never at less than the prevailing market
price. The remainder of the standard raisins were placed into a surplus pool
with the lower grade raisins. The producers were advanced fixed prices per
ton for raisins delivered into the pools.
Despite these severe restrictions on the producers' ability to market
their raisins, the Court upheld the program. The Court explained that the
prorate scheme was not prohibited by the Sherman Act because, unlike "a
contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, '"22 it "derived its
authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state." 23
In reaching the decision that the Sherman Act does not prohibit state
action, the Court assumed that Congress could prohibit a state from main-
taining a program like the California prorate program under the commerce
clause. The Court noted, however, that considerations of federalism
weighed against lightly attributing "an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents. '24 Nowhere in the Sherman Act
is a state as such mentioned. Though the Court had only recently permitted a
state to sue for damages under the Sherman Act, 25 that interpretation was
based on "the purpose, the subject matter, the context and the legislative
history of the statute."26 In Parker, similar inquiry into the legislative
history led to the conclusion that the statute was directed, not at "state
action or official action directed by a state," but at "combinations to
restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and corpora-
tions."27
19. The broad objectives of the Act were "to conserve the agricultural wealth of the State"
and "to prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products" of the state. Id. at
346.
20. Id. at 348.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 350.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 351.
25. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
26. 317 U.S. at 351.
27. Id.
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In the Court's view, the California prorate program clearly constituted
state action. The state created the machinery for establishing the program,
approved it through the Commission, adopted and enforced it in the execu-
tion of a governmental policy. 28 The Court noted, however, that certain
types of state action might not be excepted from the operation of the
Sherman Act: first, an authorization to private individuals to violate the
Sherman Act or a declaration that their action was lawful,29 and second,
state participation in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade. 30
The casual manner in which the Court noted these exceptions and its
brief discussion of them suggests that they were intended to cover clearly
defined situations: when the state attempted to circumvent the operation of
the Sherman Act within its borders or when the state acted other than as
sovereign. 31 Subsequent attempts to delineate the boundaries of the Parker
exceptions, however, have produced a "quagmire" 32 of legal reasoning.
II. BETWEEN PARKER AND CANTOR: THE QUAGMIRE
The holding in Parker, combifned with the sweeping language of the
Court, established the general proposition that state government action is not
subject to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act-a doctrine that is commonly
known as the state action exemption. 33 If the existence of the exemption was
28. Id. at 352.
29. Id. at 351. The Court cited Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) as
support for this proposition, which seems almost self-evident in light of the supremacy clause.
30. 317 U.S. at 351-52. Though nominally state action, such government activity is private
and proprietary in nature. The state has thus abdicated its position as sovereign and subjected
itself to Sherman Act liability. This distinction seems borne out in the Court's conclusion:
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agree-
ment and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly
but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit.
Id. at 352.
31. The latter situation would simply require that a court make the distinction between
governmental and proprietary action as made, for example, in the torts area. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 977-84 (4th ed. 1971).
32. Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MIcH. L.
REV. 333 (1967); Note, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor View of the Antitrust
and Constitutional Ramifications of Petitioning the Government, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 281
(1973).
33. This label has been criticized as misleading. Slater has described the use of the term as
somewhat unfortunate, since
[t]echnically, no doctrine of exemption was necessary for the ruling in Parker v.
Brown, . . . [Tihe rationale was simply that the federal antitrust laws do not and
were not intended by Congress to apply to conduct sanctioned by the state govern-
ments. The Parker decision is therefore one of non-applicability. To term the doc-
trine as one of "exemption" is really a misnomer since conduct which does not
violate an act hardly needs to be exempted from its application.
Slater 71 n.4. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1279 n.5 (3d Cir. 1975).
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clear, its precise limits were not. The infrequent Supreme Court cases which
referred to Parker before the Court reexamined the issue in 1976 in Cantor
did little to clarify either the guidelines to be followed in its application or
the underlying rationale.34 In attempting to apply Parker, the lower courts
encountered two difficult questions: whether a challenged activity con-
stituted state action and, if so, whether it fell within one of the exceptions.
The frequent failure of the courts to distinguish between the two inquiries
made it difficult to predict and interpret decisions. Faced with fact situations
different from that in Parker, the courts developed various tests for finding
state action which often produced inconsistent results. Instead of offering
guidance, the expressed rationale of Parker-that the Sherman Act was not
intended to reach state action-raised additional questions in light of the
expansion of the commerce clause power.35 The variety of tests and results
seemed to reflect particular courts' attitudes toward the continuing validity
of Parker36 or the challenged activity itself.
37
A. The First Inquiry: Whether a Challenged Activity Constitutes State
Action
The program held exempt as state action in Parker was adopted by a
state commission established pursuant to a statute with the expressed pur-
34. Most of the cases before Cantor that referred to Parker cited it for its discussion of the
commerce clause issue and not of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
35. Slater 84-86. Slater suggests that given the changed interpretation of the scope of the
commerce clause by 1942, "the rational approach . . . would therefore have been . . . to
inquire whether Congress at that time would have wanted the supremacy clause to override
state action which violated the spirit of our antitrust laws, and if so to what extent." Id. 85-86.
36. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972); see notes 72-76 infra and accompanying text. The Hecht court indicated that
it was the overly broad language of Parker which had provided the basis for a much more
expansive governmental action immunity doctrine in later cases and "opened the eyes of the
antitrust bar to the possibilities of avoiding the impact of the antitrust laws, if only state
governmental action is in some way involved." 444 F.2d at 936. In light of the importance of the
federal antitrust laws, the court rejected as "too talismanic," id. at 934, the general statement
that the antitrust laws do not apply when unequivocal state action can be established. Id. at 938.
It then used a balancing test to reject antitrust immunity for the action of the District of
Columbia Armory Board which prohibited any professional football team other than the
Washington Redskins from using Kennedy Stadium during the term of the Redskins' lease. See
notes 142-45 infra and accompanying text.
37. In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), where a gas production formula based on
false figures had been set by the Railroad Commission, the court's desire not to find state action
was obvious in its narrow construction of the state action exemption. The court indicated: "[I]t
is not every governmental act that points a path to an antitrust shelter. . . . Each case must be
considered on its own facts in order to determine whether or not the anticompetitive conse-
quence is truly the action of the state." 438 F.2d at 1294 (emphasis added). The court then
found no state action on the ground that the Commission would not have intended the
consequences of its action. Id. at 1295. See notes 51-55 infra and accompanying text.
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pose of restricting competition and maintaining prices. Accordingly, many
courts have attempted to base findings of state action on the presence of
similar elements: an expressed intent by the state to restrict competition, or
state involvement in the activity through implementation, supervision, con-
trol or compulsion. 38 The emphasis the courts have placed on these factors,
however, has not been consistent.
1. Intent. In Parker the Court found that the California legislature
intended, through the challenged program, to restrict competition among
raisin producers and maintain the prices at which raisins were sold to
packers. 39 Some courts have held that clearly expressed intent to implement
a state policy through anticompetitive measures is necessary for application
of the Parker doctrine, but again, not all agree.
38. The situation in Parker also involved a federal statute which, though not expressly
providing for state programs such as the one challenged, seemed to contemplate them. See 317
U.S. at 354 (discussing the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246 (codified
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1970)). The Parker Court found the California program to be
consistent with the purposes of the federal act, 317 U.S. at 354-58, but did not use that factor in
its resolution of the Sherman Act issue. It has been suggested, nevertheless, that such a federal
'enabling statute" should be required for an exemption of state action from the antitrust laws.
Note, State Action Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, 50 B.U.L. REV. 393, 400 (1970).
39. 317 U.S. at 346. These specific goals were designed to effectuate the underlying policy
of conserving the state's agricultural wealth and preventing waste in marketing agricultural
products. Id. The Sherman Act has also been interpreted as having two levels of objectives: a
basic goal--'to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources possible"--and the more
specific goals enumerated in the Act itself, which are a form of indirect governmental regulation
to achieve the basic goal. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 399 F.2d
953 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The District of Columbia Circuit indicated direct government regulation
could be used to achieve the same basic goals. Id. Several commentators have suggested that
regulation need not be inconsistent with the underlying goals of the antitrust laws, which, when
so broadly defined, seem coextensive with the public interest. See Handler, Regulation Versus
Competition, 43 A.B.A. ANTrrRusT L.J. 277, 289-91 (1974) (suggesting Congress, not the
courts, must decide whether competition or regulation best advances the public interest in a
particular situation); Kauper, An Overview, 43 A.B.A. ANTITusT L.J. 295 (1974). See also
Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1170-71 (1975) (state should
be able to choose among antitrust goals of preservation of small competitors and preservation
of competition to insure allocative efficiency and adequate quality at a fair price if both cannot
be realized).
The distinction between the two goals of the Sherman Act may have underlain the Parker
Court's statement that states cannot authorize violations of the Sherman Act, see notes 107-08
infra and accompanying text, if such were designed to circumvent both goals. If the Parker
holding that states can authorize anticompetitive conduct were read to apply only if the
underlying goal was not thereby circumvented, an apparent inconsistency between the holding
and the exception would be avoided. Such a reading of Parker would allow the courts to reach
anticompetitive legislation designed for special interest groups, not the general public good, for
example, licensing barbers. One commentator proposes a primary jurisdiction approach for
such situations which would allow the courts to intervene if there were no expressed intent to
administer competition and insufficient procedural protections. Verkuil, State Action, Due
Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 340-50 (1975).
In the context of professional regulation, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Goldfarb and
Cantor as standing for the proposition that:
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In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc. 40 such
intent was deemed to be a sine qua non if an activity was to qualify for
exemption from the antitrust laws. The court stated that antitrust immunity
was available only when the state government determines that competition is
not desirable in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide an
alternate form of public regulation. 41 In instances where state policy was
neutral or silent with respect to restraints of trade, or was procompetitive,
Parker would be inapplicable. In Whitten, a local official had adopted
specifications for public swimming pools on the urging of a builder and
dealers who had drawn the specifications so that only they could comply,
thus effectively eliminating competition for contracts to build pools. The
court determined, however, that in requiring competitive bidding for gov-
ernment contracts, the state had expressed an intent "to respond to the
signals of a competitive market," 42 thus indicating a procompetitive state
policy. The effects of the local official's action were therefore contrary to
state intent and his adoption of the specifications was accordingly held
insufficient to confer antitrust immunity on the builder.43
The Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar44 also empha-
sized intent in rejecting a claim of state action.45 Goldfarb involved a
To survive a Sherman Act challenge a particular practice, rule, or regulation of a
profession, whether rooted in tradition or the pronouncements of its organizations,
must serve the purpose for which the profession exists, viz. to serve the public. That
is, it must contribute directly to improving service to the public. Those which only
suppress competition between practitioners will fail to survive the challenge.
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977).
40. 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
41. 424 F.2d at 30.
42. Id. at 31.
43. Id. The court noted that though the action was "in form governmental," the real
decisionmakers were private businessmen and their activities were not protected by Parker. Id.
at 30.
44. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
45. The Court based its finding of no state action on several factors including the intent of
the state supreme court, the nature of the state bar, see notes 49 & 61 infra and accompanying
text, and the fact that the challenged action was not required by the state. The Court did not
specify the relative importance of the factors it considered and indicated that a finding that the
activity was required by the state would only satisfy the threshold inquiry as to whether Parker
would apply, thus leaving doubt as to the exact standards to be employed. See Surety Title Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 305 (E.D. Va. 1977); Note, The State
Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89
HARV. L. REV. 715, 726 (1976); see notes 150-51 infra and accompanying text.
At least one court has interpreted Goldfarb as establishing that "absent state authority
which demonstrates that it is the intent of the state to restrain competition in a given area,
Parker-type immunity or exemption may not be extended to anti-competitive government
activities." Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit then
noted that such intent could be demonstrated either by explicit language in state statutes or
could be inferred from the powers and duties granted to a particular entity. Id. See notes 61-81
infra and accompanying text.
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challenge to minimum fee schedules adopted by state and county bar
associations and enforced by possible disciplinary action for repeated viola-
tions. 46 The Court found that "far from exercising state power to authorize
binding price fixing, [the Virginia Supreme Court had] explicitly directed
lawyers not 'to be controlled' by fee schedules." 47 The Virginia Supreme
Court had suggested that attorneys refer to fee schedules for guidance in
establishing their fees. Therefore, the adoption by the bar associations of
mandatory minimum fee schedules was not required by the state supreme
court and was also contrary to that court's intent. The fee schedules thus
were not exempt from the antitrust laws. 48
The Supreme Court in Goldfarb avoided any potential conflict between
the state's intent as expressed by the state supreme court and the intent of the
bar association by construing the latter as a private organization, at least
with respect to the fee schedules. 49 The First Circuit in Whitten did not
discuss the official's intent, perhaps assuming that any actions contrary to
the desires of the state were outside the scope of his authority. The court also
implied that his position was not important enough to allow his intent to be
attributed to the state.
50
While express state intent to limit competition has thus been considered
dispositive by some courts in determining that an activity is exempt from the
Sherman Act, an express provision limiting competition has not always led
to automatic immunity. In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Alumi-
num Co. of America,5 1 the Fifth Circuit relied on an implied contrary intent
to preclude a finding of state action. The Texas Railroad Commission was
empowered by statute to restrict competition among well producers in order
to prevent waste through overproduction of natural gas. In setting the
proration formula, the Commission looked to market forecasts supplied by
The Court assumed in Goldfarb, without discussion, the continuing validity of the state
action exemption.
46. 421 U.S. at 791 n.21.
47. Id. at 789.
48. Id. at 789-91.
49. See note 61 infra and accompanying text. The Court relied on the fact that the state bar
association was a state agency only for the purpose of acting as an administrative agency of the
court to implement its rules and regulations. VA. CODE § 54-49 (1974). Cf. Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2697 (1977) (state bar acted as agent of state supreme court in enforcing
disciplinary rule banning attorney advertising).
50. In discussing the possible application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see note 134
infra, the court noted:
The entire thrust of Noerr is aimed at insuring uninhibited access to government
policy makers . . . . mhe efforts of an industry leader to impose his product
specifications by guile, falsity, and threats on a harried architect hired by a local
school board hardly rise to the dignity of an effort to influence the passage or
enforcement of laws.
424 F.2d at 32.
51. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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the large producers. 52 Because of false production forecasts filed by the
large producers, the formula adopted had a disproportionate effect on small
producers. Despite the existence of an express statutory intent of the state to
restrict competition and the fact that the Commission was clearly a state
agency for purposes of adopting such proration formulas, the court held that
no state action was present because the Commission had not intended the
specific anticompetitive results.53
Although the deliberate attempt by the large producers to subvert the
administrative decisionmaking process and the lack of meaningful supervi-
sion of the preparation of the forecasts or verification of them by the
Commission may justify the result in Woods, the court's approach creates
analytical difficulties. While purporting to find no state action, the court
actually determined that this particular kind of state action should not be
protected by Parker54 even though the state had expressly determined that
free competition would not be in the best interest of its citizens. 55 The
jurisdictional approach established in Parker, however, does not permit the
Sherman Act to reach state activities simply because a court deems those
activities unwise. 56 Nevertheless, the language of the Woods court has
served as a basis for other decisions limiting the scope of Parker.57
52. The Commission could, however, modify any figures it considered inaccurate. 438 F.2d
at 1292.
53. "Hence defendants' conduct here can in no way be said to have become merged with
the action of the state since the Commission neither was the real decision maker nor would have
intended its order to be based on false facts." Id. at 1295.
54. "[lIt is not every governmental act that points a path to an antitrust shelter." Id. at
1294. See Slater 97-101. Slater interprets Woods as standing for the proposition that "state
action which is so ill-advised as to serve no state purpose will be insufficient to invoke a Parker
exemption." Id. 97. The Commission's action constituted such action since it produced no
public benefit to balance against the injury to competition. Slater believes this exception to
Parker immunity is limited to cases involving "easily demonstrated factual error or administra-
tive ineptitude." Id. 103.
55. In Cantor the Supreme Court attempted to avoid this dilemma by holding Parker
inapplicable to actions by private parties unless the states' participation were sufficient to make
such a holding unfair. See notes 169-78 infra and accompanying text. This reading of Parker
rested on a distinction largely ignored in Parker and subsequent cases and failed to reach the
underlying question of whether the jurisdictional approach is desirable.
56. The Parker decision was based on concern for principles of federalism and the determi-
nation "that Congress had left the states some power to regulate their own economic activities
and that the judiciary should not undertake to plug the gap that the legislature had left open."
Note, Of Raisins and Mushrooms: Applying the Parker Antitrust Exemption, 58 VA. L. REV.
1511, 1514 (1972). Accordingly, Parker and the demise of substantive due process require that,
though there may be little economic justification for the anticompetitive scheme and its
desirability may be open to question, "when confronted with a potential conflict between
regulatory and antitrust statutes, the courts cannot legitimately opt for what they consider to be
the wiser of the alternatives." Id. 1512. See generally Verkuil, supra note 39.
57. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1047 (1972).
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The better approach, and one consistent with the Supreme Court's
language in Parker, is illustrated in Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State
Development Agency. 58 In contrast with Woods, Ladue held that the activi-
ty of a bi-state agency establishing a monopoly in public bus transportation
in St. Louis was exempt. The court emphasized the importance of the states'
determination that it was in the public interest to establish such a monopoly,
stating that if there exists an explicit public policy against free competition
in an essential industry, "state control and regulation of that industry, even
to the extent of eliminating competition, is permissible." 59 Since the activi-
ty challenged was conducted pursuant to legislative authorization' and the
anticompetitive effects were anticipated by the legislatures, the court had
little difficulty in finding state action protected by Parker.
In most cases, however, the intent of the state is not as clear as in
Ladue. Where the challenged activity is that of a statutorily established
entity, the court must determine if the entity's intent can be attributed to the
state. Such inquiry has tended to turn on the scope of the entity's authority.
Once again, however, the courts have established no consistent tests to
determine when a state agency is acting outside the scope of its authority.
In Goldfarb, the promulgation of minimum fee schedules by the state
bar association was held not to constitute state action since the bar associa-
tion was a state agency only for limited purposes, none of which included
fostering "anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members. ' 6'
Similarly, in Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. FTC,62 the Fourth
Circuit held that the anticompetitive actions of a local tobacco board could
not be attributed to the state. Though the state intended local tobacco boards
to make reasonable regulations for the sale of leaf tobacco at auction in order
to achieve economical and efficient handling, 63 the court determined that
such intent did not include price fixing or making regulations in restraint of
trade.64 Since the court concluded that the tobacco board was not a public
agency,65 it looked only to the statute granting the board regulatory powers
58. 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
59. rd. at 137.
60. Id. at 133.
61. 421 U.S. at 791. See note 45 supra. By statute, the state bar association acted
as an administrative agency of the [Virginia Supreme] Court for the purpose of
investigating and reporting the violation of such rules and regulations as are adopted
by the Court under this article . . . and requiring all persons practicing law in this
State to be members thereof in good standing.
VA. CODE § 54-49 (1974).
62. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-465 (1975).
64. 263 F.2d at 505.
65. The court noted several factors that influenced its decision that the tobacco board was
not a public agency; the board was organized primarily for the benefit of those engaged in the
business; its rules and regulations were enforced by consent of the members to the articles of
association; the state bore no part of the expense; the officers and directors were not elected or
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and not to the actions of the board itself. Thus, both Goldfarb and Asheville
Tobacco adopt the view that an entity granted regulatory powers by statute
does not act within the scope of its authority if its activities impose a
restraint on trade without express authorization. 66 Accordingly, such ac-
tivities are not exempt from the antitrust laws.
In contrast, in E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port
Authority67 the First Circuit upheld as state action the decision of the Port
Authority to grant one firm the exclusive right to conduct fixed base
operations at the municipal airport. It noted that the Port Authority was by
statute a public instrumentality exercising its powers in the performance of
an essentially governmental function and operating solely for the benefit of
the public. 68 There was no indication that in establishing the Port Authority
the legislature had contemplated that it would engage in or authorize anti-
competitive activity, yet the First Circuit attributed to the state the Port
Authority's decision to end competition among fixed base operators at the
airport.
These decisions might be distinguished by the differences in the nature
of the entities involved. The Port Authority in Wiggins was considered a
public agency, exercising many powers possessed only by governmental
entities.69 The tobacco board in Asheville Tobacco, however, was not
considered a purely public agency,70 even though it was granted specific
regulatory powers by the state legislature. 7'
appointed by the state; the officers and directors were not accountable to the state; and the
board was not required to comply with statutory requirements for state agencies. 263 F.2d at
509-10. One commentator has suggested that though the board's action was state action it did
not qualify for the Parker exemption because the final decision was made not by an indepen-
dent state official but by a group of individuals whose interests were potentially conflicting with
the public interest and the interests of those regulated. Slater 92-94.
66. The Goldfarb Court did leave open the question as to whether approval of the minimum
fee schedules by the state supreme court would have been sufficient to evoke Parker protec-
tion. 421 U.S. at 791. See Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COLuM. L. REV.
191, 195 n.32, 211 (1976). It has been suggested that the state intention to supplant competition
with regulation should be made clear through express statutory authorization of the agency's
use of anticompetitive measures. See Note, supra note 56, at 1522.
67. 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966).
68. 362 F.2d at 55.
69. Id. However, in Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975), immunity was
denied municipal corporations whose authority to manage public facilities was not considered
to ificlude the right to discriminate against certain suppliers. See note 73 infra.
70. See note 65 supra.
71. It may also be significant that the Supreme Court in Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791, and the
Fourth Circuit in Asheville Tobacco, 263 F.2d at 509, felt that the challenged anticompetitive
activities were designed to benefit the members of the entities adopting them, whereas in
Wiggins the First Circuit noted that the Port Authority was acting for the benefit of the public.
See note 68 supra and accompanying text. The Third Circuit in Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521
F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) did not address the question as to whom the alleged boycott was
designed to benefit.
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In Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. ,72 the District of Columbia Circuit was
faced with a case where no such distinction could be made. There was no
question that a public entity was involved. The court, however, refused to
find that the anticompetitive activity of a government agency constituted
state action absent a clear expression of intent by the legislature that the
agency so act. 73 The District of Columbia Armory Board had entered into a
thirty-year lease with the Washington Redskins whereby the Armory Board
agreed not to lease or rent the stadium to any other professional football
team during the term of the contract. The Armory Board was empowered by
statute "to determine all questions concerning the use of the stadium" and
to rent or lease "all or any part or parts of the stadium" at such rent and "for
such periods of time as the Board shall determine. 74 There was no showing
that the restrictive covenant was necessary for the board to exercise its duty
to lease the stadium, and the covenant was not "directly authorized" by
Congress. 75 The court therefore held that Parker was inapplicable, refusing
to find the intent of the Armory Board determinative.
76
72. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
73. Similarly, in Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit
held that the grant of broad powers to municipal corporations to make contracts and do all
things "necessary or convenient" for the management of municipal facilities was not sufficient
to invoke Parker immunity since the alleged boycott could not be considered compelled by state
law. Id. at 1281.
Certain of the defendants undoubtedly had the statutory power to choose products to
be sold through the concessions in the public facilities which they own and operate as
a function of their authority to manage the facilities. However, nothing explicit or
implicit in their statutory authority mandates or permits discrimination against certain
suppliers.
Id. The court noted, however, that if the state's intent that an entity be allowed to employ
anticompetitive measures could be inferred from the entity's duties and powers, Parker immun-
ity would apply. Id. at 1280. See note 45 supra. Similarly, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co. 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 963 (1977), the court
held that municipal corporations are not automatically exempt from the antitrust laws:
Rather, a district court must ask whether the state legislature contemplated a certain
type of anticompetitive restraint. In our opinion, though, it is not necessary to point
to an express statutory mandate for each act which is alleged to violate the antitrust
laws. It will suffice if the challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent.
Thus, a trial judge may ascertain, from the authority given a governmental entity to
operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action
complained of.
532 F.2d at 434 (footnotes omitted).
74. 2 D.C. CODE § 1723 (1973).
75. 444 F.2d at 934.
76. The court's attempt to distinguish Wiggins and Ladue is unconvincing. After emphasiz-
ing that in those cases states had created separate public service non-profit corporations as state
agencies to perform functions the states could have performed for themselves, the court stated:
We suggest the obvious distinction of Wiggins Airways and Ladue LocalLines from
the case at bar is that when Congress empowered the Armory Board to construct,
maintain, and operate Kennedy Stadium, it was empowering the Armory Board to do
what another governmental agency. . . could have done as straight forward federal
governmental action, i.e., operate the stadium with full authority to rent to exhibitors
of football games. On the rationale of Ladue and Wiggins such governmental agency
action would not be subject to antitrust challenge, nor is the Board's management of
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Whether Parker requires a clear expression of state intent that anticom-
petitive measures be used to implement a state policy is unclear.7 7 Requiring
such an intent raises several difficulties: the reason for a statute or regulation
might have been considered too obvious to require expression or discussion,
the inclusion of such purpose could be dependent on the skill or influence of
its proponents, 78 and the legislative history or other public record could be
misinterpreted by the courts. 79 Where there is a clear expression of state
intent to restrict competition, it should be dispositive of the state action
question, 'at least when the state has substituted some form of regulation. 80 If
the only expression of state intent is the creation of a regulatory agency, or
the grant to a public agency of authority which could reasonably be con-
strued to include anticompetitive activities, the decision is more difficult.
The principles of federalism expressed in Parker, however, argue strongly
for a finding of state action in such situations if there is evidence that the
activity represents the considered judgment of the agency. 81 The application
of the Hecht approach to state agencies is not necessary to further the
objectives of the Sherman Act and may unduly restrict a state from legislat-
ing in the public interest. When the entity is not considered to be a public
the stadium per se challenged. But what Congress did not do is create the Board as an
instrumentality to own and operate the only professional football team to be allowed
to play in the stadium; hence, neither the Board nor the Redskins in this case are
performing a function that a purely governmental agency itself could have per-
formed.
Id. at 939. How granting the Redskins an exclusive lease transformed the Board from the
manager of the stadium to the manager of the Redskins is not clear, especially since there was
no showing that at the time the lease was entered into there was any other professional football
team desiring to lease the stadium.
77. The Court stated in Parker that the Sherman Act was not intended to restrain "a state
or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature," 317 U.S. at 350-51 (emphasis
added), or "state action or official action directed by a state." Id. at 351 (emphasis added). This
language would seem to require an intent by the state itself that anticompetitive activity be
undertaken. In applying its interpretation of the Sherman Act to the specific program challeng-
ed, however, the Court noted that California, acting through the Commission, had adopted and
enforced the program and subsequently rephrased it as "the state in adopting and enforcing the
prorate program." Id. at 352. Thus, at least where the statutory grant of authority contemplates
anticompetitive measures an intent to allow the specific action taken by the state agency or
official may be inferred. See note 73 supra.
78. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610.
79. One commentator has expressed concern that if the courts apply the clear statement
and active regulation requirements with insufficient force, the state may only be forced to
"make a record" to legitimate regulation and that may not be sufficient to protect the policies
of the federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56, 237 n.54
(1976).
80. Even if the Court were to adopt a balancing test such as that proposed by Mr. Justice
Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610, state sanction of anticompeti-
tive activity would be an important factor in favor of holding the antitrust laws inapplicable.
81. See text accompanying note 87 infra. Requiring such evidence would provide protec-
tion in situations like that in Woods, where there was little indication the state agency was
aware of the potential consequences of its action.
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agency, as in Asheville Tobacco, requiring a clearer expression of intent
seems justified.
2. State Involvement in Anticompetitive Activity. State involve-
ment in anticompetitive activity in the form of approval, adoption, supervi-
sion or compulsion is most significant to the state action inquiry in the
context of regulated industries. In such cases, the courts typically do not
inquire into state intent, probably assuming that an intent to restrict competi-
tion is inherent in the creation of the regulatory agency.
There no longer seems to be any doubt that the antitrust laws apply to
public utilities .8 2 It remains unclear, however, under what circumstances the
Sherman Act actually proscribes any of their activities. For a utility's action
to be protected under the Parker doctrine, the courts generally have required
either that the final decision about a challenged activity be made by the state
regulatory agency or that the particular activity be subject to its supervi-
sion.-3 Most courts have required more than a mere power to control on the
part of the regulatory agency. 4 The Fourth Circuit, however, in a much'
criticized decision,8 5 upheld promotional activities by an electric company
on the ground that because the State Corporation Commission had the power
to stop such activities, its initial silence more likely indicated approval than
abandonment of administrative duty.8 6 The Fifth Circuit has applied the
Parker exclusion to rates and practices of monopolistic public utilities when
they are "subjected to meaningful regulation and supervision by the state to
the end that they are the result of the considered judgment of the state
regulatory authority.' 87 The court found the requisite intimate involvement
82. See generally Cantor, 428 U.S. at 596 n.35; Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973).
83. The Fifth Circuit recently stated: "We can scarcely envision a function more particu-
larly 'sovereign' than the implementation of a rate structure on a public utility," and "regula-
tion by a governmental body of the rates to be charged by a public utility are [sic] a classic
example of the Parker v. Brown exemption." Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129,
1133-34 (5th Cir. 1975).
84. See, e.g., Marnell v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 391, 409-10 (N.D. Cal.
1966). The court held that mere power to control did not constitute state action where the
agency had failed to exercise that power.
85. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
86. Id. at 252. It is interesting that the court prefaced its holding with a quote from its
decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930
(1966), in which it stated that to constitute state action for the purposes of Parker, action by
private individuals must be under the active supervision of the state. 438 F.2d at 251. Although
silence hardly seems equivalent to active supervision, the court noted the Commission's
subsequent modification and then disapproval of the electric company's actions, which perhaps
did indicate initial approval and thus a more active supervision than would appear at first
glance. Id. at 252.
87. Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
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of the state, not only in its power to control the challenged rate schedule but
also in its exercise of such control through holding adversary proceedings on
each schedule and then ordering them into effect, sometimes with major
modifications. 88
The Supreme Court has indicated that where a specific activity is not
directly authorized by statute but only permitted under a general statutory
grant of authority, no state action will be deemed to exist unless the specific
activity is subsequently adopted by the state or its agents. In Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. 89 a subsidiary of Union Carbide
was delegated authority by a Canadian agency to purchase and allocate all
vanadium products required by Canadian industries'. The Court stated that
although discriminatory purchasing by the subsidiary might be considered
permissible under Canadian law, it was clearly not required and was there-
fore subject to the antitrust laws. 90 The Court, however, did not base its
decision on the absence of intent to restrict competition, but on the finding
that no officials within the Canadian government had approved or would
have approved of any efforts to monopolize the production and sale of
vanadium or had directed discriminatory purchasing. 9' It appears, therefore,
that such approval or direction by an agent of the government might have
insulated the activity from the antitrust laws.
In Goldfarb the Court examined both the intent of the state92 and its
involvement in the challenged activity in rejecting a claim that the adoption
of minimum fee schedules by state and county bar associations constituted
state action. No state law expressly required minimum fee schedules. The
Virginia Supreme Court, empowered by statute to regulate the practice of
law, had suggested reference to "[t]he fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services" 93 in order to avoid excessive fees.
Although suggested fee schedules of state and local bar associations could
be used to determine such customary fees, the court had indicated that "no
lawyer should permit himself to be controlled thereby. " 9 Thus, the state
bar could at best claim that its adoption of the mandatory 95 fee schedule was
prompted by the ethical opinions of the state supreme court. The Supreme
Court held that this did not constitute state action since it was not "compell-
88. 440 F.2d at 1139-40.
89. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
90. Id. at 706-07. This could be interpreted as requiring that a statute contemplate and
specifically require the anticompetitive activity. See note 73 supra.
91. 370 U.S. at 706.
92. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
93. Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(b) (3), 211 Va. 295, 313 (1970).
94. Rules for Integration of the Virginia State Bar, 171 Va. xvii, xxiii (1938).
95. The fee schedule was mandatory only in the sense that repeated departures from the
schedule could give rise to disciplinary action. 421 U.S. at 791 n.21.
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ed by direction of the State acting as a sovereign. "96 As in Continental Ore,
the Court left open the question of whether approval would have provided
sufficient state involvement to shieldthe action from the antitrust laws.
97
However, the Court's statement that the activity must be required by the
state in order to meet the threshold inquiry about state action 98 suggests a
stricter standard than that normally applied in the public utility cases where
the exercise of control over anticompetitive activities has been held suffi-
cient. 99 Though the Court did not define what would constitute compulsion
by the state,100 the term does not seem to include general supervision or even
subsequent approval of specific activities. 1
01
In reaching its decision, the Court appeared to be more influenced by
the expressed intent that attorneys not be bound by the fee schedules than by
the insufficient state involvement in the activity as revealed by its failure to
require or even approve the fee schedule. If the lack of compulsion in
Goldfarb is considered important primarily as an indication of state intent,
then in cases where an anticompetitive intent can be inferred from the degree
of state involvement, a lack of compulsion would not be determinative.
10 2
96. Id. at 791.
97. Id.; Robinson, supra note 66, at 195 n.32.
98. 421 U.S. at 790.
99. See notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
100. One commentator writing after Goldfarb has defined state compulsion as meaning that
"compliance with the Sherman Act would cause a defendant to violate a prohibitory state
statute, or would prevent a state agent from fully carrying out the duties delegated to him."
Note, supra note 45, at 725. Under this definition, anticompetitive conduct by a regulatory
board could be considered compelled without a specific statutory provision if it were deemed
necessary to the board's duties. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972), discussed at notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court's recent decision on attorney advertising offers at least one example of
what constitutes state comnpulsion. In holding that the Arizona Supreme Court's rules prohibit-
ing such advertising were not liable to antitrust attack, the Court distinguished Goldfarb:
In the instant case, by contrast, the challenged restraint is the affirmative command
of the Arizona Supreme Court under its Rules 27(a) and 29(a) and its Disciplinary
Rule 2-10(B). That Court is the ultimate body wielding the State's power over the
practice of law, . . . and, thus, the restraint is 'compelled by direction of the State
acting as a sovereign.'
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2697 (1977) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)). The Court did not reach the question of whether anything less
than an affirmative command by the entity with ultimate power would have sufficed.
101. The Cantor decision further complicates the state action question for regulated indus-
tries by holding that approval and compulsion may not be sufficient to insulate a utility's action
from the antitrust laws. See notes 154-60 infra and accompanying text.
102. Even under this interpretation of Goldfarb, however, its standard would likely preclude
a finding of state action where the state involvement is insufficient to imply an intent that a
particular anticompetitive activity be used to implement a state policy. See, e.g., Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); Alabama Power Co.
v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968). There
is some indication that the Fifth Circuit has moved to a stricter standard than that in Alabama
Power. In that case the court held that a borrower who had obtained requirements contracts
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Goldfarb therefore appears to suggest that the inquiry into the degree of
state involvement is a substitute for the inquiry into state intent, and
involves similar considerations-whether or not the action is truly that of
the state. 103 Accordingly, if the state agency, acting within the scope of its
authority, makes a determination based upon its considered judgment that an
anticompetitive activity is desirable, state involvement should be considered
sufficient to warrant exemption from the antitrust laws.
B. The Second Inquiry: The Parker Exceptions
Even if a court finds state action, it still must determine if a challenged
activity is within one of the two exceptions described in Parker. If the state
has effectively authorized a private violation of the Sherman Act or if it has
joined in a private anticompetitive agreement, Parker is inapplicable. 10 4
Though the two exceptions are more easily stated than the requirements for
state action, they are at least as difficult to apply. In making a determination
with respect to state action, a court can examine factual similarities to
Parker and look to its experience in constitutional law for guidance. 105
with electricity distributors as security required for a loan from the Rural Electric Administra-
tion was immune from suit under the antitrust laws since there was no provision for court
review of the REA loans. Thus a broad statutory grant of authority was deemed sufficient to
allow the adoption of anticompetitive measures. 394 F.2d at 674-77. Judge Godbold dissented
on the grounds that an express delegation of authority to use anticompetitive measures was
necessary to confer immunity on the administrator and the borrower. Id. at 680-81. The District
of Columbia Circuit in Hecht interpreted the Fifth Circuit's decision in Woods as a "significant
shift" toward Judge Godbold's approach. 444 F.2d at 934-35 n.6. In Gas Light Co. of Columbus
v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit found state action in the
Georgia Public Service Commission's approval of rate schedules. The court noted the Commis-
sion's "intimate involvement" in the ratemaking process through giving lengthy consideration
to the schedules, holding full adversary hearings, and at times making modifications. Id. at
1140. The schedules were thus products of the "considered judgment" of the Commission. Id.
Though this may indeed represent the adoption of a stricter standard, it is not clear that the
Fifth Circuit would not have found state action with a less favorable fact situation.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 431 U.S. 963 (1977), the court noted that "the argument that lower state entities
are automatically exempt from the Sherman Act has been laid to rest by the Supreme Court in
Goldfarb. The test now is whether the challenged action is the type of activity which the
legislature intended the governmental body to perform." The court distinguished Alabama
Power as involving the problem of reconciling various federal statutes. 532 F.2d at 435-36 n. 10.
103. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
104. 317 U.S. at 351-52. If a given set of facts seems to fall within one of the Parker
exceptions, it could be characterized as not constituting state action at all. This seems particu-
larly true in the second exception where the state can be said to have waived its sovereign
status. However, since "authorization" could take the form of a permissive state statute, see
notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text, activity within the first exception would clearly seem
to be state action by any definition.
105. Though the two inquiries are not thought to involve the same considerations, the Court
in Cantor referred to Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), as involving an
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There is little guidance, however, for the application of the exceptions, and
unless they are interpreted on their most simplistic level-where the state
suspends operation of the Sherman Act within its borders or acts in the role
of a private individual-their meaning is unclear. While some courts have
interpreted the exceptions in this way, others have taken a much broader
view, perhaps out of a desire to restrict the scope of the Parker doctrine by
expanding the exceptions. °6 Such expansive interpretations have further
blurred the poorly defined distinctions between the general rule of Parker
and its exceptions, making it difficult to determine whether a court is
rejecting a claim to immunity because there is no state action or because the
state action involved falls within an exception.
1. State Authorization of Sherman Act Violations. After sweeping
language allowing an exclusion of state action from the reach of the Sher-
man Act, Parker set out the first exception: "True, a state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman .Act by authorizing them to
violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful." 10 7 As support for this
proposition, the Court cited Northern Securities Co. v. United States,108 in
which it had held that a railroad holding company, though permitted under
New Jersey law, was nonetheless subject to the Sherman Act. The wording
of the exception seems to contemplate two separate parties-the state and
"those who violate the Sherman Act' '-and to reflect the Court's belief that
the former cannot immunize the latter from the sanctions of a federal law
either by "authorizing" them to act in disregard of the Sherman Adt or by
declaring that their actions in violation of the Act are nonetheless lawful.
Interpreted thus, the exception stands for the proposition that a state cannot
suspend the operation of the Sherman Act within its borders-hardly sur-
prising in light of the supremacy clause.
This narrow interpretation of the first exception has not been adopted,
however. Rather, courts have considered minimal state involvement to
analogous situation in which state action was not found because the option to engage in the
challenged activity was the public utility's, despite nominal approval by the regulatory authori-
ty. I'd. at 357, cited in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 594 n.31. The dissent disagreed with the plurality's
use of Jackson, noting that:
mhis constitutional holding has no bearing on whether a utility's action in com-
pliance with a tariff which it proposed is exempt from Sherman Act liability. The
latter is a question of legislative intent, not constitutional law, and must be answered
on the basis of a separate line of authority-namely, decisions such as Parker and
[Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.] Noerr [Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961)] which have construed the Sherman Act.
428 U.S. at 624-25 n.10.
106. One commentator has perceived a desire on the part of a significant number of lower
courts to narrow the Parker antitrust exemption. Slater 91.
107. 317 U.S. at 351.
108. 193 U.S. 197, 350 (1904).
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constitute implicit authorization of private anticompetitive activity. In
Northern Securities, for example, the state's involvement could be con-
strued as nominal at most, since the only claim to state authorization lay in
the fact that the state corporation laws permitted the type of holding com-
pany in question.'°9 Similarly, the Third Circuit in Norman's on the Water-
front, Inc. v. Wheatley10° decided that such nominal state action was not
protected by Parker, apparently considering it within the first exception. A
Virgin Islands statute required the listing by wholesalers and retailers of
minimum prices for their products and then prohibited sales below those
prices. The court held that since the control board had "no power to
approve, disapprove or modify the prices fixed by private persons,""'I there
was insufficient governmental involvement to invoke Parker. 112 Instead of
"genuine governmental action controlling the anticompetitive practice,"113
the mandatory price stabilization scheme constituted "an attempt by govern-
ment officials to authorize individuals to perform acts which violate the
antitrust laws." 1 14
The difficulty in this approach to the first exception lies in distin-
guishing state authorization from state control of the anticompetitive activi-
ty. The Third Circuit seems to have employed a quantitative test, although
the Norman's opinion is not entirely clear on this point. I 5 The fact that the
Board had no power to approve, disapprove or modify the prices was
apparently interpreted as indicating a lack of sufficient involvement by the
government. Requiring genuine governmental action controlling the activity
109. See note 171 infra.
110. 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971).
111. Id. at 1018.
112. The court also found that the statute was not valid under the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(2)-(5) (1970), which, though allowing "states to authorize voluntary price maintenance
agreements-and to require retailers not parties to such agreements to adhere to the prices set
therein . . . does not go so far as to permit a state or territory to enact a mandatory price
stabilization scheme." 444 F.2d at 1016 (emphasis by court).
113. 444 F.2d at 1"8.
114. Id.
115. The court's discussion of other cases offers little clarification. The court'noted that the
Supreme Court in Parker had "emphasized the extensive government involvement" in the
California marketing program, id. at 1017, and referred to several cases in which courts had
looked to the degree of state involvement. E.g., Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power
Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972) (active regulation by the
state, including full adversary hearing on rates); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966) (insurance rates set by bureau created and actively
supervised by the state). In several instances, however, the type of state involvement seems as
significant as the degree-the ability of the bureau in Lanier to approve, disapprove and modify
the rates, the similar ability of the Commission in Gas Light to modify rate schedules after
adversary hearings, and the ability of the State Corporation Commission in Washington Gas
Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 1971) to prohibit challenged
promotional allowances despite its initial silence on the issue. 444 F.2d at 1017-18.
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could therefore be construed as requiring pervasive governmental participa-
tion. The government's inability to approve, disapprove or modify could be
seen, however, as indicating a lack of the proper type of governmental
action for Parker purposes. The court's use of the words "genuine,"
"controlling" and "authorize" suggest that it may have felt the govern-
ment's action was insufficient in a qualitative as well as a quantitative sense.
If a purely quantitative test is employed, the first exception would merely
require that more than nominal state involvement be found, regardless of the
nature of that involvement. Such an interpretation is especially troublesome
in light of the fact that even "nominal state involvement" has already been
deemed sufficient by the court to satisfy the threshold requirement of state
action. 16 In many cases pervasive state involvement would satisfy both
tests. It is possible, however, that a state might delegate most of the
activities necessary to implement an anticompetitive policy and still main-
tain effective control, thereby meeting only a qualitative standard. The
approach in Norman's would not allow the application of Parker in the
latter situation.
A similar interpretation of the first exception may have prompted the
Supreme Court's reference to Parker in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp. 117 Schwegmann involved an attempt by distributors of gin
and whiskey in interstate commerce to enjoin a retailer from selling the
distributors' products at less than the minimum resale price established in
contracts with other retailers in Louisiana. A Louisiana statute authorized
such contracts and provided that once a seller learned of the existence of
such a contract between a distributor and any retailer in the state, his sale of
the product at less than the stipulated price would constitute unfair competi-
tion.118 The distributors contended that this marketing arrangement was
authorized by the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, which
provides that "nothing herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or
agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale" of particular com-
modities when local law makes "contracts or agreements of that description
• . . lawful as applied to intrastate transactions." 19 When the amendment
was passed, non-signer clauses formed integral parts of each of the forty-
two state fair trade statutes then in effect; an earlier California fair trade
116. See notes 82-103 supra and accompanying text. One commentator has proposed a
"pervasive regulatory scheme test" under which an exemption would be found only if the state
had entrusted an agency with "the power both to administer a comprehensive regulatory
scheme. . . and to adjudicate antitrust issues." Note, supra note 38, at 410. In other words,
the state must provide sufficient control to perform the antitrust function. Id. 416.
117. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
118. LA. GEN. STAT. §§ 9809.1-.6 (Bobbs-Merrill 1939). The current version of the statute is
found at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.391-.395 (West 1965).
119. Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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statute without a non-signer clause had proved ineffective.120 Nevertheless
the Court held that the amendment exempted only resale price agreements
between a wholesale supplier and its retailers. Therefore, attempts to bind
non-signers to those contracts fell within the scope of the Sherman Act. 12'
Though it did not directly address the issue, the Court apparently felt that the
state statute also failed to exempt attempts to bind non-signers since they fell
within the first Parker exception. "[W]hen a state compels retailers to
follow a parallel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sher-
man Act forbids."' 122
The Court's narrow interpretation of the Miller-Tydings Amendment 123
may have justified its conclusion that actions pursuant to the Louisiana
statute were not thereby exempted from the prohibitions of the Sherman
Act, but the implications of its reference to Parker are bothersome. The
intention of Louisiana to allow such anticompetitive effects was evident
from its fair trade laws, and the state provided a means for enforcing fair
trade contracts through its courts. 124
The Court, however, did not consider this state action of the type
protected by Parker. If this was not sufficient state involvement to invoke
Parker, the implication is that the state itself must implement the anticom-
petitive activity. Following the statement of the two exceptions, the Parker
Court did stress the amount of state involvement, 125 and implied that if
120. 341 U.S. at 398 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121. 341 U.S. at 389. The Court stated that prohibitions against "horizontal price fixing by
those in competition with each other at the same functional level" were expressly continued,
and interpreted horizontal price fixing to include enforcement of fair trade agreements against
non-signers. Id. Congress, however, did not accept this interpretation and enacted the McGuire
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)-(5) (1970), as an amendment to section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, to allow states to include non-signer provisions in their fair trade laws.
Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1015 (3d Cir. 1971).
122. 341 U.S. at 389. The statement in Schwegmann that "[t]he fact that a state authorizes
the price fixing scheme does not, of course, give immunity to the scheme, absent approval by
Congress," id. at 386, has been cited as support for the position that Parker does not apply to
any anticompetitive activity required by the state unless there is a federal "enabling statute."
The Court in Schwegmann, however, was addressing only the implementation of a federal
authorization of a particular type of price fixing by private individuals through the vehicle of
state fair trade laws. It determined that Louisiana's statute went further than Congress had
intended in enacting the Miller-Tydings Amendment. Even if the Schwegmann Court's analysis
is applicable beyond the context of the Miller-Tydings Amendment, it is highly doubtful,
especially in light of its one casual reference to Parker, id. at 389, that the Court intended
thereby to limit the Parker holding. It seems more likely that the'Court felt the situation in
Schwegmann would fall within the first of Parker's exceptions.
123. 444 F.2d at 1015.
124. It has been suggested that the state compulsion in Schwegmann may have been simply
too circuitous to give rise to Parker immunity. Simmons & Fornaciari, State Regulation as an
Antitrust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. CINN. L. REV. 61,66-67
(1974).
125. "It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate program.
Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, and a prorate program,
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private individuals used state-established machinery to effectuate an other-
wise illegal anticompetitive scheme, such nominal state involvement would
not be shielded from the antitrust laws. 126
Louisiana's action in Schwegmann could be so construed. 27 The
language of the Court in Schwegmann is not so limited, however, since it
refers to a state compelling or demanding anticompetitive private conduct. If
this is considered a restatement of the first Parker exception, it is difficult to
imagine instances of private action which would be protected by Parker. 128
2. State Participation in Private Anticompetitive Conduct. The
second Parker exception includes situations wherein the state or one of its
subdivisions becomes "a participant in a private agreement or combination
by others for restraint of trade." 129 Although no case law exists that
specifically interprets the second exception, it apparently means that only
state action in a sovereign capacity and not in a proprietary capacity is
protected by Parker. 30
Such an interpretation is supported by dicta in Continental Ore. 131 The
approved by the Commission, must also be approved by referendum of producers, it is the
state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and which enforces it with
penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy." 317 U.S. at 352.
126. The Court stated that the approval of the California prorate program by referendum of
producers was "not the imposition by them of their will upon the minority by force of
agreement or combination which the Sherman Act prohibits." Id.
127. Such a construction is strained, however, since allowing the enforcement of fair trade
contracts against non-signers served to execute a governmental policy against what Louisiana
considered unfair competition. 341 U.S. at 387 n.2. A distinction can be drawn between Parker
and Cantor on the basis of absence of governmental policy since the Court found Michigan's
policy toward the distribution of light bulbs to be neutral. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 585. See text
accompanying notes 158-60 infra.
128. The Cantor plurality reached the conclusion that Parker was not intended to protect
private conduct and declined to extend its protection to such conduct unless failure to do so
would be unjust. 428 U.S. at 489-93. See notes 163-78 infra and accompanying text.
129. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
130. Such an interpretation is suggested by the remainder of the paragraph in which the
Court stressed California's involvement as a state in the California Prorate Program:
It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate program
... lit is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and
which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy
... .The state itself exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation and
in prescribing the conditions of its application.
rd. at 352. Though private individuals were involved in the California program, the activity was
still governmental in nature, imposed by the state as sovereign.
This interpretation also seems supported by the case cited following the statement of the
exception. Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), involved a city council
resolution giving produce dealers free rent and moving expenses to encourage them to move to
a new produce market constructed and promoted by the city and railroad in a joint venture. The
Court held the discriminatory rates to be in violation of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-45
(1970), rejecting the claim that the participation of a political subdivision of the state gave the
railroad immunity.
131. See notes 89-91 supra and accompanying text. "The fundamental distinction between
Parker and Continental Ore was that governmental action in Parker consisted of a regulatory
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Court noted in that case that the corporate defendants were "not insulated by
the fact that their conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign
government," when those acts were not approved or compelled by
Canadian law but were merely designed to eliminate a competitor of the
agent's parent corporation.132 This distinction was also made in Goldfarb.
The Court found that the state bar, in adopting and enforcing the minimum
fee schedule, was acting for the benefit of its own members outside of its
authority to administer regulations of the state supreme court. It was there-
fore merely a participant in private anticompetitive action and not excepted
from the operation of the Sherman Act. 133
If this exception is limited to proprietary acts of a state, it is not
problematic, since courts must frequently-make this distinction. Continental
Ore and Goldfarb, however, do not use the term "proprietary," and in
Union Pacific at least part of the city's involvement was in a governmental
capacity. 134 If the words of Parker in describing the exception are not given
this interpretation, however, courts would have to weigh the relative degree
of involvement of the state and the private parties to determine if the latter is
sufficiently dominant to prevent the activity in question from constituting
program while the governmental action in Continental Ore involved direct participation-
buying vanadium as would a private concern." Note, Antitrust-Immunity--Government Par-
ticipation Does Not Exempt a Lease from the Antitrust Laws Absent an Unequivocal Manifes-
tation of Contrary Congressional Intent, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1972).
132. 370 U.S. at 706.
133. 421 U.S. at 791-92. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975), in which
the court held that a municipal corporation was not immune from suit for allegedly conspiring to
boycott one supplier's products in managing public facilities. The court stated:
After Goldfarb ...it is clear that when there is an allegation of governmental
participation in such a combination to the benefit or detriment of private parties, and
when the activities of the public body are not compelled by the state acting as a
sovereign, a claim has been stated under the antitrust laws.
Id. at 1282. See note 73 supra. See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532
F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 963 (1977).
134. See Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450(1941). Three circuits have rejected
the distinction between governmental and proprietary actions for purposes of Parker. In
Ladue, the Eighth Circuit stated that even if sovereign immunity had been waived in the
challenged bi-state compact, or by the states' engaging in a proprietary action, the states were
still not liable under the antitrust laws. 433 F.2d at 135-36.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431,434 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. granted, 431 U.S. 963 (1977), the Fifth Circuit noted:
[W]e cannot accept defendant's invitation to import the discredited proprietary-
governmental distinction into this area of the law. This contention is unsupported by
authority and is irrelevant under Parker and Goldfarb, which look only to the scope
of the legislative action and not the "proprietary" or "governmental" nature of the
subordinate governmental body's conduct.
See Slater 89-90. In a somewhat analogous situation the First Circuit has held that the Noerr-
Pennington immunity from the antitrust laws for attempts to petition the government, Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), expanded in
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), was not applicable to attempts to influence the
government in a proprietary capacity. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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state action. The application of the second exception would then be similar
to that of the first. Indeed, from the language employed by some courts,
especially in cases involving regulatory boards, it is difficult to determine if
they have found no state action or state action excepted from the Parker
holding.' 35 The difficulty in defining the limits of the exceptions has com-
plicated the task of the courts since the reach of the Sherman Act under
Parker will not only include private anticompetitive activities but some state
action, despite the broad language of the Parker Court.
C. Dissatisfaction with the Parker Doctrine.
In most instances, once a court has determined that the challenged
activity is state action within the meaning of Parker, and not excepted from
Parker's holding, its inquiry has ended. Some courts and commentators,
however, have suggested that the inquiry should not be confined to a
jurisdictional analysis. 136 Instead, they have proposed various methods of
preventing the action of a state from contravening the federal antitrust laws,
ranging from abolishing the state action exemption 37 to using a primary
jurisdiction approach similar to that employed in federal agency adjudica-
tion. 138 On the other hand, there is concern that without the Parker doctrine
courts would use the federal antitrust laws to strike down state regulations
considered unwise-a form of "substantive antitrust" review. 139 Principles
135. For example, in Woods, the Fifth Circuit stated "[I]t is not every governmental act that
points a path to an antitrust shelter," indicating that certhin state actions would be excepted
from Parker. 438 F.2d at 1294. The court went on to phrase its inquiry in terms of whether the
anticompetitive consequence was truly the action of the state, indicating a switch in inquiry to
whether state action was present. Id. The court's finding that the actions of the large producers
had not merged with the action of the state implies that it felt the challenged action was not state
action, but this is rendered uncertain by the clear involvement of the Railroad Commission.
136. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972) ("After a study of the rationale back of the decided cases in this area of
antitrust law, we consider . . . the rule derived by appellees [that federal antitrust laws are
inapplicable to direct governmental action as distinct from private conduct] is a much too
talismanic approach where scrupulous distinctions are called for."); Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1294 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972) ("We reject 'the facile conclusion that action by any public official
automatically confers exemption.' "); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) ("We are particularly reluctant
to rely on verbal formulae to solve problems of antitrust liability.").
137. See Slater. Slater would replace the jurisdictional approach of Parker with a balancing
test which would sustain state regulation "if the state could demonstrate that it had a valid
reason behind its regulation and that the interest furthered by the regulation was of greater
significance than preserving competition." Id. 104. A balancing test has also been proposed by
Mr. Justice Blackmun in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610-1I, see text accompanying note 206 infra, and
by the court in Hecht, see notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text, notes 142-48 infra and
accompanying text.
138. Verkuil, supra note 39, at 346-50.
139. Verkuil, supra note 39.
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of federalism emphasized in Parker suggest the necessity for some defer-
ence to the states' interest in regulating industry within their borders at least
when such regulation is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
federal antitrust laws." As has been noted, a judicial overruling of Parker
would probably result in state withdrawal from various areas of commerce
now under state regulation before Congress could act to provide substitute
federal regulation. 141
An interesting case in this regard is Hecht.142 The court rejected the
argument that the leasing of a municipal stadium constituted government 143
action within the meaning of Parker and proposed a six-part balancing test
for determining whether government action should be immune from the
federal antitrust laws. Factors to be considered in determining whether the
state action was permissible as not contravening the federal antitrust laws
would include:
[T]he specific language of the congressional statute involved, any legis-
lative history which would throw light on the congressional intent, the
relative importance of the governmental action which is asserted to
override antitrust policy, whether the governmental agency is required
to take into consideration the possible anticompetitive effect of its
actions, whether the agency is required to adhere to a clearly defined
and restricted statutory directive, and to what extent the agency's
actions are subject to judicial review.144
Though Hecht involved the construction of two potentially conflicting
federal statutes and thus did not present problems of federalism, the District
of Columbia Circuit indicated that the test would also be applicable if a state
statute were involved. 145
Such a balancing test, recommended by Judge Godbold of the Fifth
Circuit for federally regulated industries, 16 would prevent the federal anti-
trust laws from being subordinated unless the state's interest was important,
and might encourage consideration by the state of the anticompetitive
140. See note 39 supra. The essence of Parker has been described as the rule that when
inconsistency between the antitrust laws and state regulation stems from different regulatory
objectives rather than conflicting treatment of the same subject matter, the state regulation is
not so repugnant to the federal statute as to be invalid. Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15 (1976). And "the preservation
of our federalism overrides whatever benefits might flow from extending the reach of antitrust
by limiting the ambit of the state action defense." Id. 20.
141. Note, supra note 45, at 721.
142. See notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text.
143. Since Hecht arose in the District of Columbia the case was concerned with federal
governmental activity equivalent to state action.
144. 444 F.2d at 935.
145. Id.
146. Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc., 394 F.2d 672, 689-92 (5th Cir.),
(Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 488 (1968).
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implications of its regulations. As applied to two federal statutes, the
balancing test would simply require a determination as to whether the latter
is intended to modify the former. When a federal and a state statute are
involved, however, the court must examine the federal statute to determine
if it was intended to (and constitutionally did) preempt state regulation in
that area. The Parker Court assumed that Congress could have reached
programs such as the California Prorate Program under the commerce clause
had it so intended, 47 but found no indication of such intent. Though the
Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the Sherman Act has been
criticized, until Congress indicates disagreement with the Parker holding or
the Court rejects Parker's jurisdictional premise, the approach suggested in
Hecht should not be extended to state regulations. 1
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT'S RE-EXAMINATION OF PARKER:
CANTOR v. DETRoTr EDISON Co.
After thirty years of virtual silence on the Parker state action exemp-
tion, 149 the Court's discussion of state action in Goldfarb was primarily the
enunciation of another "verbal formula"150 for recognizing state action.
The decision provided an illustration of when a state agency was merely
participating in a private agreement in restraint of trade. It also indicated that
the Court was not ready to abandon the Parker doctrine. The basic question
as to what constitutes state action within the meaning of Parker, however,
was left unclarified. 151
In Cantor, the Court was confronted with a challenge to a portion of a
public utility's rate structure. 15 2 The Court held that neither Michigan's
147. 317 U.S. at 350.
148. One commentator has suggested that although the reasons for granting a state action
exemption differ from those for granting a federal action exemption, the Hecht test can be used
for the former "because its central inquiry is into the intent of the legislature ... to supplant
the federal antitrust laws with some other form of regulation." Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone
to Hecht: A New Test for State Action Exemptions, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 288 (1973). While the
intent of the legislature may indicate whether an anticompetitive activity constitutes state
action, the balancing of state and federal interests envisioned by Hecht is inconsistent with the
jurisdictional approach of Parker. See Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 124, at 73.
149. See note 34 supra. The few cases during this period which referred to the state action
exemption did little to explain Parker's rationale or to offer guidelines for its application.
150. See note 136 supra.
151. Though the Court mentioned the absence of several factors which led to the conclusion
that the minimum fee schedule was not required by the state, the very factors enumerated
produce ambiguity in the Court's use of the words "required" and "compelled." It is unclear,
for example, if approval by the Virginia Supreme Court of the ethical opinions of the State Bar
setting out the minimum fee schedule would have been considered compulsion. See note 97
supra and accompanying text. The Court also left unatfswered what was meant to follow its
threshold inquiry as to whether the anticompetitive activity is "required by the State acting as
sovereign." 421 U.S. at 790. See note 178 infra.
152. The courts have frequently applied Parker in this situation. See note 83 supra.
Vol. 1977:871]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
approval of the tariff nor the fact that the challenged program could not be
terminated until a new tariff was approved was sufficient to exempt the
program from the antitrust laws. 153 Five Justices agreed with this conclu-
sion, and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred on the ground that neither state
sanction of a scheme nor a state requirement of anticompetitive conduct
itself exempted such conduct from the Sherman Act. Perhaps the most
significant aspect of the decision is its affirmation of the state action
exemption. Far from clarifying its scope, however, the differing approaches
of the four opinions may well increase the difficulty of determining when
the exemption will be applied.
In Cantor, the Detroit Edison Company, sole distributor of electricity
in southeastern Michigan, was alleged to be restraining competition in the
distribution of light bulbs through its light bulb exchange program. 154
Detroit Edison was pervasively regulated by the Michigan Public Service
Commission which is empowered by statute to "regulate all-rates, fares,
fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service, and all other matters
pertaining to the formation, operation, or direction of . . . public
utilities."' 55 The Public Service Commission first specifically approved a
tariff filed by Detroit Edison incorporating the light bulb exchange program
in 1916 and implicitly reaffirmed its approval with each new tariff filed. 156
Thus, though the light bulb exchange program was not carried on by Detroit
Edison pursuant to any statutory directive, it had been formally approved by
the regulatory agency according to its statutory authority. Moreover, until a
new tariff was filed and approved, Detroit Edison was required to adhere to
the tariff then in effect.
Despite nominal approval of the program through the Commission and
nominal compulsion to maintain the program, the Court felt that the light
bulb exchange program did not "implement any statewide policy relating to
light bulbs," 157 since the distribution of light bulbs was unregulated, no
other utility had such a program, and neither the Michigan legislature nor
the Commission had investigated the need for or desirability of such a
program or its anticompetitive effects.158 The Court 59 concluded that the
153. 428 U.S. at 598.
154. The program was initiated in 1886 by Detroit Edison's predecessor to increase the
consumption of electricity. Under the program a new customer receives as many bulbs as
needed, then turns in burned out bulbs to receive replacements in proportion to his use of
electricity.for lighting. Though there is no direct charge for the bulbs, their cost is absorbed by
the rates for electricity, allegedly saving consumers about $3 million a year. Id. at 583.
155. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.6 (West 1967).
156. 428 U.S. at 583. In 1964, Detroit Edison's decision to discontinue the program for large
commercial customers was approved as part of a rate reduction for such customers. Id.
157. Id. at 585.
158. Id. at 584-85.
159. The Chief Justice concurred in this portion of the plurality opinion.
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state's policy was neutral as to whether a utility should have such a
program. 160
Given the state's neutral policy and its minimal involvement in the light
bulb exchange program, 61 the Court's conclusion that Detroit Edison's
activity was not immune from the antitrust laws seems warranted. 162 The
plurality based its conclusion, however, on a misinterpretation of Parker,
holding that because "the legality of any act of the State of Michigan or any
of its officials or agents" was not questioned, Cantor was "not controlled
by the Parker decision." 163 The Chief Justice,164 Mr. Justice Blackmun, 165
and the dissent t66 expressly rejected the novel interpretation that Parker
only applied to acts of public officials. As they perceived it, the rationale of
Parker and all previous case law "focused on the challenged activity, not
upon the identity of the parties to the suit."1 67 The Chief Justice, however,
160. 428 U.S. at 585.
161. The Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977), described the
Commission's action as only "acquiescence," reflecting "its conclusion that the utility was
authorized to employ the practice if it so desired." Id. at 2698.
162. In its recent decision on the advertising of legal services, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the state supreme court's disciplinary rule
prohibiting such advertising was not subject to attack under the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice
Blackmun noted for the Court that the context in which Cantor arose was critical and distin-
guished it on three grounds. First, whereas in Cantor the suit was against a private party, in
Bates the state supreme court was the real party in interest, the adopter of the rule and its
ultimate enforcer. The state bar acted "as the agent of the court under its continuous supervi-
sion," in a role "completely defined by the court." Id. at 2697. Second, the regulation of the
bar's activity was at the core of the state's power to protect the public, a traditional form of
regulation "entirely unlike" the Cantor situation where the state had no independent regulatory
purpose and the anticompetitive action was not justified by flaws in the market, responsive to
health or safety concerns or essential to the regulation of the utility engaged in the activit-.
Finally, in Bates the rule reflected a clear articulation of state policy and was subject to re-
examination in enforcement proceedings, while in Cantor the state regulatory commission
merely acquiesced in the utility's action. Id. The Bates Court's emphasis on the state's clear
and affirmative expression of policy and active supervision reflects the most frequent approach
in other decisions under the Parker doctrine. See notes 39-103 supra and accompanying text.
The Court did not reach the question whether Parker immunity extends to private parties who
are not agents of the state or to regulation of an entity which is not essential to a primary
governmental function.
163. 428 U.S. at 591-92.
164. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
165. Id. at 613 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
166. The dissent asserted that the plurality's "view of Parker, which would trivialize that
case to the point of overruling it, flies in the face of the decisions of this Court that have
interpreted or applied Parker's 'state action' doctrine, and is unsupported by the sources on "
which the plurality relies." Id. at 616-17 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell & Rehnquist, J.J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). "Significantly, the Court [in
Parker] did not find the question of whether the state or the private sector initiated the plan or
made proposals relevant to a determination of the presence of 'state action,' so long as those
proposals were subject to the scrutiny of state officials." Note, supra note 38, at 400. See also
Handler, supra note 140, at 8.
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joined the plurality in the portion of its opinion which discussed, and
rejected in this case, two reasons why private conduct required by state law
might be held exempt from the Sherman Act.168
The first of these reasons was that it would be unjust to hold a private
individual liable under the federal antitrust laws if he had done nothing more
than obey the state's command. 169 Although the Court assumed that such an
argument might be acceptable, it offered no illustrations of when state
participation would be so dominant that federal antitrust law enforcement
would be unfair, and noted that such a situation would, in fact, rarely arise
since regulatory cases typically "involve a blend of private and public
decision-making." 17 0 The Court pointed out that in several prior deci-
sions,17 "notwithstanding the state participation in the decision, the private
168. He apparently considered the plurality's discussion relevant to determining whether
this particular private conduct was of the type protected by Parker. The plurality, on the other
hand, clearly felt that exempting private conduct required by state law from antitrust liability
would be an extension of the Parker doctrine.
169. 428 U.S. at 592.
170. Id. The dissent pointed out that "[a]s the Court seems to acknowledge, such regulation
is heavily dependent on the active participation of the regulated parties, who typically propose
tariffs which are either adopted, rejected, or modified by utility-commissions." Id. at 627.
171. The reference to these cases as deciding that state "authorization, approval, encour-
agement, or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity," id. at
592-93 (citations omitted), is indicative of the problems in this catchword approach to the scope
of the state action exemption. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), is cited
for the statement: "It cannot be said that any State may give a corporation, created under its
laws, authority to restrain interstate or international commerce against the will of the nation as
lawfully expressed by Congress." Id. at 346, quoted in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592 n.26. The
contention actually rejected in Northern Securities was that a state's liberal incorporation laws
immunized a corporation taking advantage of them to destroy competition even though the state
had no reason to suspect the purpose behind the formation of the holding company. Indeed, in
its application for a charter, the corporation had misrepresented its reasons for desiring a
charter. The Northern Securities Court was probably attempting to dispel any ideas that the
Sherman Act could not reach the activity of a corporation merely because it held a state charter.
193 U.S. at 344-47. The quoted statement did not remain part of an eloquent defense of federal
power under the Sherman Act, however, but was used as the basis for the first exception in
Parker. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra. Any state conduct which could be charac-
terized as "authorization" of anticompetitive conduct was thus potentially excepted from the
state action exemption. A similar process may be initiated by this reference in Cantor. The
Court cites Parker's statement that a state does not immunize those who violate the Sherman
Act "by declaring that their action is lawful," 317 U.S. at 351, as indicating that state "approval
• ..confers no antitrust immunity." 428 U.S. at 592-93. In Goldfarb, however, the Court left
open the question as to whether the Virginia Supreme Court's approval of the state bar
association's minimum fee schedule would have required a finding of state action. See notes 97-
103 supra and accompanying text. And, lack of approval by Canadian officials was one of the
bases for finding no exemption in Continental Ore. See notes 89-91 supra and accompanying
text. It seems unlikely that any word or phrase used in one case to characterize state action can
be used in a subsequent case to define the scope of the state action exemption without an
understanding and application of the policies behind the exemption. Otherwise the words must
be continuously redefined to allow for new situations. Handler, supra note 140, at 13 has noted
that there is no logical reason or policy ground to differentiate between required, prohibited or
permitted activity. Rather, the focus should be on whether the action challenged as a violation
of the antitrust laws has been sanctioned by state law, whatever the form of sanction.
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party exercised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court to conclude
that he should be held responsible for the consequences of his decision." 1
72
Since the decision of whether to have the light bulb exchange program was
"primarily" Detroit Edison's, its participation was "sufficiently signifi-
cant" that it would not be unjust to require conformance with the antitrust
laws. Accordingly, to resolve the state action question, a court must not
only look to the degree of state involvement, as in prior cases, but must also"
determine whether "it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible for
his conduct.' ' 173 A court, therefore, must examine a factual situation from
two perspectives-the nature and degree of both state involvement and
private participation. Furthermore, it is unclear whether a quantitative or
qualitative standard should be applied.
A quantitative approach would exclude from the state action exemption
cases like Cantor, in which the state's involvement is so minimal as to
imply that the state has not really considered the desirability of the anticom-
petitive activity. 74 If used alone, however, it might produce anomalous
results. While a large amount of state involvement may be a valid indication
of the state's intent to restrict competition in a particular manner, the
converse does not necessarily follow as long as there is some indication that
the state considered the restriction. The state's degree of participation in the
decision to institute an anticompetitive activity, especially if in the form of
investigating its desirability, 175 may be primarily a function of its novelty or
controversial nature.
The Court's language is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for a qualita-
tive approach. 176 Without any further guidance from the Court, however, it
Nevertheless, the Court in Cantor offered little guidance as to what the lower courts should
attempt to achieve in applying the new tests for state action, if the two rationales can be so
characterized.
172. 428 U.S. at 593.
173. Id. at 595. A determination that it would be unfair to hold a party liable for conduct
mandated by the state might serve to prevent treble damages but not injunctive relief. Id. at 614
n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar,
431 F. Supp. 298, 309 (E.D. Va. 1977); Slater 78 n.34.
174. Such nominal state involvement is apparently .what the Fourth Circuit was referring to
in Asheville Tobacco, 263 F.2d at 509, when it stated that Parker protected only state action,
"not individual action masquerading as state action." See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying
text. See also notes 115-28 supra and accompanying text discussing the use of a quantitative
test under the first exception. Under the First Circuit's interpretation of Asheville Tobacco,
state policy was neutral toward the anticompetitive activity despite some regulation of the
industry involved. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
175. The absence of any investigation of the desirability of a light bulb exchange program by
the legislature or the Public Service Commission was an indication that the state's policy was
neutral toward the program. 428 U.S. at 584.
176. Whether a private individual exercised "sufficient freedom of choice" or an "option to
have, or not to have, such a program" or "sufficiently significant[ly]" participated in the
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is difficult to imagine what type of state participation would be sufficient,
since the Court indicated that state authorization, approval, encouragement,
participation, 17 7 or, in Cantor, requirement, do not necessarily confer anti-
trust immunity. 171
The second rationale discussed by the Court is that Congress might not
have intended to superimpose the federal antitrust laws in an area of the
economy pervasively regulated by a state. The plurality advanced three
reasons to reject this contention: inconsistent standards would not necessari-
ly be imposed; 179 even assuming inconsistency, the federal interest should
not inevitably be subordinated to that of the state; and distribution of electric
light bulbs is not a regulated area of the economy. 180 As the dissent re-
decision, id. at 593-94, could be determined by looking at the nature of the state's participation.
This would also reveal whether the state's participation was dominant.
177. Id. at 592-93.
178. In a post-Cantor decision, one district court held that the issuance of advisory opinions
by the state bar as to what constituted the unauthorized practice of law, though clearly
sanctioned by the state, was nonetheless invalid under the antitrust laws since "the harms of
the system greatly outweigh[ed] its purported benefits." Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 307 (E.D. Va. 1977). The court recognized the state's
compelling interest in licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of law and that restrict-
ing practice to those duly licensed was a legitimate and necessary exercise of that power. Id.
The court found, however, the unauthorized practice of law opinion process to be insufficiently
related to those interests since the persons to be deterred were excluded from the advisory
opinion practice and were already subject to criminal sanctions. Thus, the advisory' opinion
process was considered merely a means for allowing attorneys to define the extent of their own
monopoly. Id. at 307-08. The court's holding rested to a large extent on its belief that the
practice benefited the attorneys and not the public. rd. at 308-09. See note 39 supra. The
problem with the court's analysis lies in its assumption that it is the role of the courts
adjudicating an attack on the state-compelled process and not the state in formulating that
process to determine the public interest and the best means of serving it. The court disclaimed
any implication of ethical impropriety on the part of any members of the bar but felt that the
"anticompetitive dangers inherent in the [unauthorized practice of law] opinion process"
justified allowing antitrust attack, 431 F. Supp. at 308 n.17, since the challenged activity was
not necessary to accomplish the regulatory purpose. Id. at 307-08. The court "cautiously
discern[ed]" this standard from the language in Cantor which it interpreted as establishing,
albeit not entirely clearly, the further inquiry necessary after meeting Goldfarb's threshold
requirement of compulsion.
Whether such a standard is proper is questionable after the recent Supreme Court decision
on attorney advertising which held the Parker exemption applicable without determining that
the prohibition on advertising was necessary to the state's regulation of the practice of law.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2698 (1977); see note 162 supra. The Bates
decision further suggests that if the state is the real party in interest and the private party acted
merely as its agent, he will be protected under Parker, 97 S.Ct. at 2697.
179. It has been suggested that the establishment of the exemption in Parker was in
recognition of congressional desire to allow the states to experiment with alternative types of
regulation. Therefore, the exemption would be unnecessary to effectuate congressional intent
unless the application of the antitrust laws "would conflict with some positive regulatory action
of the state," that is, where there existed a "plain repugnancy" between the federal laws and
state regulation. Note, supra note 56, at 1520.
180. 428 U.S. at 595.
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marked, it is somewhat difficult to perceive how these reasons relate to a
determination of congressional intent.181 In discussing the first reason, the
Court noted that the purpose of some economic regulation by a government
is "to avoid the consequences of unrestricted competition,"' 1 2 citing as an
example the agricultural marketing program in Parker. In contrast, public
utility regulation is designed to protect the consumer from exploitation,
since it typically assumes that the utility is a natural monopoly."8 3 The
implication is that if state regulation is itself intended to restrict competition
in a given area of the economy, Congress would not intend that the antitrust
laws apply. On the other hand, where state regulation is designed to protect
the consumer from exploitation by a natural monopoly, the goals of the
antitrust laws and state regulation are consistent and Congress does intend
the antitrust laws to apply.184 Therefore, an industry exercising its natural
monopoly powers would be subject to both state regulation and federal
antitrust regulation. It was not necessary, however, to make this distinction
between the two types of regulation. The Court immediately qualified the
distinction by noting that there was no logical inconsistency in requiring a
utility to comply with state regulation when exercising its monopoly powers
and with federal antitrust standards when engaging in activity in competitive
areas of the economy.18 5 Thus, the Court seemed to admit that there might
be inconsistency (and therefore presumably no congressional intent to
superimpose the antitrust laws) between the antitrust laws and state regula-
tion of the utility's natural monopoly powers. However, it felt that this case
presented no problem since it was the utility's "activities in competitive
181. Id. at 627.
182. Id. at 595.
183. Id. at 595-96.
184. This apparent distinction between the two types of regulation is troublesome in several
respects. First, it assumes that congressional intent as to the scope of the Sherman Act varies
according to the nature of the entity regulated. There is no statutory statement to that effect.
Second, it would apparently find congressional intent to impose the antitrust laws on an
industry when competition was restricted by the nature of the industry, rather than by a
decision of the state that such restriction would be desirable. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 628-n. 13.
As long as the challenged activity is pursuant to state regulation it seems irrelevant whether the
statute directs the entity to engage in anticompetitive activity in order to restrict competition, or
presumes lack of competition and directs the entity to engage in activity which will perpetuate
that presumption. Finally, assuming the latter point, it seems more likely Congress would have
intended to impose the antitrust laws in areas of the economy which at the time the act -was
passed were unregulated, rather than on areas such as natural monopolies which were already
being regulated when the Sherman Act was enacted. The dissent interpreted the legislative
history of the Sherman Act as revealing "no intent to 'interfere with' state laws regulating
domestic commerce." Id. at 635.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977), however, the Court appears to have
at least partially based its holding that a prohibition on attorney advertising was immune from
antitrust attack on the ground that the practice of law is a profession traditionally regulated by
the state. Id. at 2697-98.
185. 428 U.S. at 596.
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markets" which were in question.1 86 It is difficult to follow the Court's
reasoning on the question of inconsistent standards, but it seems to be based
both on a determination that the distribution of light bulbs in Michigan was
essentially unregulated 187 and that it did not fall within the utility's natural
monopoly powers.
The second reason discussed by the Court for refusing to find that
Congress did not intend to superimpose antitrust laws on state regulated
areas of the economy was that the mere possibility of conflict between state
regulatory policy and federal antitrust policy is an insufficient basis for
implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws. 88 The Court drew on
those cases in which there was a conflict between the federal antitrust laws
and the regulations of a federal agency in which the Court has held that "an
implied repeal of the antitrust laws may be found only if there exists a 'plain
repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.' "189 Assuming
that the existence of state regulation should in some situations produce such
an exemption, the standards for determining the existence and scope of the
exemption would therefore have to be as strict as those for federal agen-
cies-finding an implied exemption only to the minimum extent necessary
to make the regulation work. As the dissent points out, the plurality's
analysis rests on a mistaken premise; 90 the doctrine of implied repeal is
only applicable when two arguably inconsistent federal statutes are in-
volved. The question is not whether the state has attempted to repeal the
antitrust laws and thereby to exempt its citizens from the operation of a
federal statute, as that would clearly violate the supremacy clause. The issue
is whether Congress intended to preempt the area. 191 Under the Parker
doctrine, the act of the state has the effect of exempting activities from the
Sherman Act. The exemption arises, however, not because the state has
repealed the Sherman Act,192 but because, according to Parker's reading of
186. Id. at 596-98.
187. The Court therefore did not reach the question of whether the standards would have
been inconsistent had the light bulb distribution program been statewide.
188. 428 U.S. at 595.
189. Id. at 597 n.36 (quoting Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
190. 428 U.S. at 629.
191. Id. at 595. Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissent perceived that:
The "implied immunity" doctrine employed by this Court to reconcile the federal
antitrust laws and federal regulatory statutes cannot, rationally, be put to the use for
which the Court would employ it. That doctrine, a species of the basic rule that
repeals by implication are disfavored, comes into play only when two arguably
inconsistent federal statutes are involved. "'Implied repeal'" of federal antitrust
statutes by inconsistent state regulatory statutes is not only "'not favored,'" [428
U.S. at 598 n.37] it is impossible.
Id. at 629 (emphasis in original). See notes 142-48 supra and accompanying text.
192. Indeed, the Court noted in Parker that states could not authorize violations of the Act
or declare them legal. 317 U.S. at 351.
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the legislative history, Congress intended that in certain circumstances the
jurisdiction of the federal government under the Sherman Act be replaced by
that of the state. If the Cantor Court's reasoning is followed and the implied
repeal test applied, any ancillary anticompetitive activities by a utility would
not meet the standard. 193 Such an approach focuses the inquiry too much on
whether the activity is ancillary to the primary regulatory scheme rather than
whether it effectuates an independent state policy. 194
The Court does not separately discuss its third reason for finding that
Congress did not intend to superimpose the antitrust laws on state regulated
activities-that, even if such intent were assumed, enforcement of the
antitrust laws in the light bulb market, an essentially unregulated area of the
economy, would not be foreclosed. 195 The conclusion that the distribution of
light bulbs was essentially unregulated, however, seems to underlie the
entire analysis of the second rationale.' 96 It was apparently this conclusion
that influenced the Court's determination that the standards were not incon-
sistent and that an implied exemption was unnecessary. In application, then,
the second rationale would be largely dependent on the resolution of the
first- whether the state was sufficiently involved in the regulatory scheme.
The Court's treatment of these two rationales is disturbing. Mr. Justice
Stewart, in dissent, described the Court as having fashioned "a new two-
part test for determining whether state utility regulation creates immunity
from the federal antitrust law." 197 The Court, however, spoke of "two quite
different reasons" which "might support" a rule that "private conduct
required by state law is exempt from the Sherman Act." '1 98 This language
and the Court's separate discussion of the two rationales suggest that
conduct which satisfied either one of the "tests" might be held exempt.
Thus, the Court might determine that a particular activity need not be
exempted to make the regulatory scheme work, for example, if it did not
satisfy the second test, but involved such dominant participation by the state
that it would be unjust to hold the private party liable. On the other hand, the
193. "For. . . if the federal antitrust laws should be construed to outlaw [Detroit Edison's)
light bulb exchange program, there is no reason to believe that Michigan's regulation of its
electric utilities will no longer be able to function effectively." 428 U.S. at 598.
194. For example, if the light bulb exchange program had been adopted statewide, see note
187 supra, after due consideration and a determination that the most efficacious means of
distribution was through the public utilities, under the Court's view the program would not be
exempt since it would not be necessary to the primary regulatory scheme, the distribution of
electricity.
195. 428 U.S. at 595.
196. See notes 188-94 supra and accompanying text.
197. 428 U.S. at 625.
198. Id. at 592.
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Court's use of assumptions 199 and inconclusive language2 0 suggests that the
Court might not apply these rationales in a future case, but instead might
impose a stricter standard. 20'
The extent to which the two rationales constitute tests determining the
scope of the state action exemption is even less certain in light of the
differences of opinion between the plurality and the Chief Justice as to the
meaning of Parker. The plurality interpreted Parker as applying only to
actions by the state or its officials or agents, 2°2 and described Cantor as
raising the issue of whether Parker should be "extended" to cover private
action approved by a state and required to be continued while such approval
was in effect.20 3 The Chief Justice disagreed that Parker could be limited to
suits against state officials. He also considered such a reading of Parker
unnecessary to the result in Cantor: Parker did not address the situation
where the state, in addition to regulating a utility's exercise of natural
monopoly powers, also purported, "without any independent regulatory
purpose, to control the utility's activities in separate, competitive mar-
kets. ' 204 He concurred, however, in the plurality's determination that
Michigan's policy towards the light bulb exchange program was neutral,
noting that to base a state action exemption on Michigan's "undifferentiated
sanction of this ancillary practice" would not serve any state or federal
policy. 20 5 If the state's involvement were more than an undifferentiated
sanction of an ancillary practice in a separate competitive market, the Chief
Justice would surely find a state action exemption more readily than the
plurality since to do so would not require an extension of his interpretation
of Parker.
199. One commentator has described the Court's form of argument as assuming "without
deciding the merits of issues whose relative significance was left unstated. "The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, supra note 79, at 234.
200. For example, the Court noted that "even though there may be cases in which the
State's participation in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private party
responsible for his conduct implementing it," Cantor presented no such unfairness. 428 U.S. at
594-95 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court stated:
Therefore, assuming that there are situations in which the existence of state regula-
tion should give rise to an implied exemption, the standards for ascertaining the
existence and scope of such an exemption surely must be at least as severe as those
applied to federal regulatory legislation.
Id. at 596-97 (emphasis added).
201. In fact a future Court might either (I) note that the Cantor Court did not affirma-
tively endorse any test governing the scope of the state action exemption and proceed
to disavow the relevance of standards that were discussed; or (2) note that Cantor left
open the possibility of denying an exemption to even those programs that met the tests
it did articulate and proceed to add new ones.
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 79, at 236 n.32.
202. 428 U.S. at 591.
203. Id. at 582.
204. Id. at 604.
205. Id. at 604-05.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Cantor, suggested
that the jurisdictional approach of Parker be replaced by a rule of reason,
"taking it as a general proposition that state-sanctioned anticompetitive
activity must fall like any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits,"
with the "fact of state sanction figuring powerfully in the calculus of harm
and benefit.''206 The remaining justices declined to adopt his approach,
though the interpretation which the plurality gave the Parker decision would
severely limit its applicability. 2 7 The dissent, in contrast, expressed the
belief that "[t]he 'state action' doctrine of Parker v. Brown, as clarified by
Goldfarb, represents the best possible accommodation of [the limiting intent
of Congress in passing the Sherman Act] and the post-1890 judicial expan-
sion of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act.'208 Whether the state
action doctrine after Goldfarb was, as the dissent suggested, effectively
"perform[ing] the salutary function of isolating those areas of state regula-
tion where the State's sovereign interest is, by the State's own judgment, at
its strongest, and limit[ing] the exemption to those areas,''209 is question-
able. The inconsistent approaches taken by the lower courts in examining
the factors relevant to a finding that Parker was applicable indicate that
some further clarification of the doctrine was necessary. The solution
proposed by the Court in Cantor, however, hardly seems the best one.2 10 If
the two reasons for holding private conduct required by the state immune
from the antitrust laws are in fact to be employed as standards for determin-
ing the scope of the state action exemption, they will create difficulties. The
first would require a court not only to ascertain the degree of state involve-
ment in the challenged activity, but also to determine if holding the private
party liable for such activity would be fair.211 The standards by which
fairness is to be measured were not indicated and the addition of such an
imprecise element to an already difficult inquiry seems unnecessary. The
second would require a court to determine if Congress intended the antitrust
206. Id. at 610-11. Such a proposition is not novel. See notes 14248 supra and accompany-
ing text.
207. 428 U.S. at 589-91. The dissent noted that:
[I]f Parker v. Brown. . . could be circumvented by the simple expedient of suing the
private party against whom the State's anticompetitive command runs, then that
holding would become an empty formalism, standing for little more than the proposi-
tion that Porter Brown sued the wrong parties.
Id. at 616 n.4. See notes 164-66 supra and accompanying text.
208. 428 U.S. at 637.
209. Id.
210. One district court has perceived, not too surprisingly, that after Cantor, "[t]he precise
scope of the state action exemption is not entirely clear." Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 305 (E.D. Va. 1977).
211. 428 U.S. at 592-95. See notes 169-78 supra and accompanying text.
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laws to apply to an area of the economy regulated by the state, basing this
inquiry on whether the private party would thereby have to satisfy inconsis-
tent standards and whether the regulatory provisions are necessary to effec-
tive functioning of the regulatory act.212 The difficulty in determining
congressional intent is illustrated by the Parker doctrine itself, and the
adoption without refinement of the implied repeal doctrine developed in
cases involving federal regulatory agencies ignores the principles of federal-
ism emphasized by the Parker Court. 213
If the Court was unwilling to adopt a straightforward balancing test
such as that suggested by Mr. Justice Blackmun, it would have been
preferable to adopt an approach focusing on elements considered important
by the lower courts-the intent of the state to restrict competition and the
degree of state involvement. If state intent took the form of express statutory
authorization, the activity would be protected. If state intent were expressed
by a state agency, the activity would be protected if it fell within the scope
of the agency's authority. If no state intent could be determined, active state
control, supervision or involvement in the activity would imply such an
intent, and the activity would be protected. In each instance, the court would
refuse to apply the Parker doctrine unless it felt the activity could reason-
ably be construed to reflect the considered judgment of the state or its
authorized agents or it determined that Congress did not intend the
antitrust laws to apply to such activity. Such an approach would in fact serve
to limit the application of the state action exemption to those cases where the
state's interest is strong, unlike the undifferentiated sanction without any
independent regulatory purpose in Cantor.214 Such an approach would also
allow the state itself to determine when the public interest could best be
served by anticompetitive measures, thus avoiding "the selective interdic-
tion of those anticompetitive state regulatory measures that are deemed not
'central' to the limited range of regulatory goals considered 'imperative' by
the federal judiciary."215
212. 428 U.S. at 595-98. See notes 179-89 supra and accompanyinq text.
213. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
214. 428 U.S. at 605 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
215. Id. at 640 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell & Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). See note 178
supra.
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